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Rethinking the Mérida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must
Change Course in its Approach to Mexico’s Drug War
by Stephanie Erin Brewer*

s drug-related violence surges in northern

U.S.

Mexico,

government officials have come to place urgent

priority on the need to reduce drug trafficking south
of the U.S.-Mexico border. Citing this goal, the U.S. government began in late 2008 to implement a multi-year, $1.4 billion
foreign aid plan known as the Mérida Initiative with the stated
purpose of enhancing Mexico’s ability to reduce crime, with
overwhelming emphasis on the drug trade. This aid package
complements other forms of U.S. security aid to its southern
neighbor, including millions of dollars in annual military aid
from the Department of Defense.1 Yet an examination of the current Mexican and regional context leads to the conclusion that
without a paradigm shift in design, the hundreds of millions of
taxpayer dollars earmarked for the Mérida Initiative and other
anti-drug aid to Mexico will fuel a dysfunctional approach to
public security—one that is characterized by widespread human
rights violations within the framework of an ineffective war
against criminals that has not reduced drug-related violence.
This misguided public security paradigm contrasts sharply
with an alternative approach that, rather than battling the symptoms of the drug trade, would primarily target the engine that
drives it: namely, demand for drugs in the United States. The
need for a clear break with past strategies and a significant
focus on demand reduction is all the more salient in light of the
growing recognition by political actors and analysts in the region
that the Americas are in dire need of a new approach to reducing drug trafficking—and that the United States could have a
decisive role to play in taking this step forward.
This article, which forms part two of a two-part series examining Mexico’s public security policies from a human rights
perspective, presents an overview of the Mérida Initiative and
discusses its current and potential impact on respect for human
rights in Mexico.2 It concludes that now is the time for the U.S.
administration to rethink the Mérida Initiative and other public
security aid programs, paving a new path that efficiently targets
the driving forces behind drug trafficking while respecting and
promoting human rights.
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A

Introduction

Special Forces during an operation in Culiacán, Sinaloa State, Mexico.

President George W. Bush in March 2007.3 In the following
months, officials of both administrations met to draw up the
basic structure of the proposed package,4 which centered largely
on providing material and technical support to Mexico’s security
forces in their war against drug criminals.
The final version of the Mérida Initiative, signed into law by
Bush on June 30, 2008, channels $400 million worth of support
from the United States to Mexico in its first year,5 including
$116.5 million in military assistance.6 The detailed spending
plan prepared by the U.S. State Department in September 2008
outlines the proposed uses of Mérida funding, including the
purchase of airplanes and helicopters for the Mexican military
for surveillance, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism operations;7 the purchase of scanners and armored vehicles;8 the
establishment of law enforcement databases;9 training for
specialized police units combating organized crime;10 and anticorruption activities in the federal police.11 At the time of the
Initiative’s enactment, the U.S. government contemplated at
least two more years of funding, with a total anticipated amount
of $1.4 billion.12 In 2009, Congress approved a total of $300
million in Mérida funding for Mexico.13 This lower amount may
signify a reduction in total Mérida spending over the contemplated three-year period.
The initial Mérida spending plan, in addition to its law
enforcement components, also mentions prevention activities
including online training of drug treatment counselors,14 as well
as “rule of law” and “human rights activities,”15 including technical assistance in the implementation of judicial reforms. As will
be explained below, 15% of the money in certain funding categories will be reserved until the U.S. State Department reports
that Mexico has achieved four specific human rights goals. Yet
viewed in the context of the Initiative’s overall design and fund-

The Mérida Initiative
The Mérida Initiative aid package originated in a meeting
between Mexican President Felipe Calderón and former U.S.
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[Fifteen percent] of the money in certain funding
categories will be reserved until the U.S. State
Department reports that Mexico has achieved four
specific human rights goals. Yet viewed in the context
of the [Mérida] Initiative’s overall design and funding
distribution, these human rights elements come
across as side features to the package.
that receives the second most military19 and police aid from
the United States in the Western Hemisphere.20 As mentioned,
Mérida funding does not prevent Mexican security forces
from continuing to receive other aid from the U.S. Defense
Department21 through programs that are less transparent and
receive less scrutiny than the Mérida Initiative22. Meanwhile,
much of the Mérida funding not earmarked for the army will
nevertheless go to increasingly militarized police forces, as
military officers take over a growing number of command posts
within the Mexican police.23
In this climate, the most relevant question is not whether U.S.
anti-drug funding provides training or equipment to a certain
soldier or police officer who engages in demonstrated human
rights violations (although it will be particularly grave if this
takes place24). Rather, the Mérida Initiative and additional military aid support a security paradigm in Mexico that has thus far
engendered human rights violations by deploying forces trained
for war to perform the work of civilian police and has failed to
hold military forces accountable for such violations. That the
U.S. government, with its enormous political and economic
influence, should support Mexico’s security forces in this environment curtails opportunities for the U.S. to call upon Mexico
to respect human rights within and beyond its public security
operations.

ing distribution, these human rights elements come across as
side features to the package. The Initiative’s design leaves no
doubt that it is overwhelmingly geared toward law enforcement
activities, including military operations, undertaken in the current battle against criminals. It is worth underscoring that the
Mérida Initiative follows years of U.S. counternarcotics aid to
Mexican security forces,16 a process that continues to influence
the approach to drug trafficking deployed by the Mexican government.

Reinforcing a Dysfunctional Public
Security Paradigm
The severity of the threats posed by drug trafficking and
related violence is undeniable. It is precisely due to the gravity of these problems that efficient responses are required both
nationally and regionally to bring about sustainable reductions
in the drug trade. At the same time, any drug-fighting plan
must avoid supporting or increasing existing forms of violence,
including violence committed by state agents.
In light of these criteria, the most severe flaw in the Mérida
Initiative is that it reinforces the war-like mentality that has led
Mexico to deploy its military and police in a territorial battle
against criminals as the answer to drug trafficking. This war on
crime has brought with it a steeply escalating universe of human
rights violations against Mexico’s residents, including arbitrary
killings, torture, and illegal arrests.17 Furthermore, this strategy
has not led to a decrease in drug-related violence but rather has
seen a tripling of drug-related homicides in the past three years,
with the number of killings in 2008 now estimated at 5,630 and
with more than 1,000 killings reported by Mexican media for the
first fifty-one days of 2009.18
One could argue that the United States can avoid fueling
human rights violations in Mexico by withholding funding
from certain military or police units shown to be responsible for
such abuses or by waiting to disburse assistance until Mexico
has met certain human rights requirements. Yet, even assuming
that the U.S. government strictly adheres to such measures, the
Mérida Initiative as a whole sends an unmistakable message of
political support for the Calderón administration’s violent drug
war. With the Mérida Initiative, Mexico has become the country

A Call for a New Model in the Fight
Against Drug Trafficking
In addition to these concerns, the consistently ineffective
track record of frontal-combat approaches to reducing drug trafficking leave little doubt that supporting such an approach now
will not end the drug trade, despite any short-term increases in
the number of arrests or amount of drugs seized. Other largescale security operations to fight drug traffickers at various
points over the past few Mexican administrations have resulted
in the arrests of high-profile drug kingpins or shifted drug trafficking routes from one place to another. They have not shown
signs, however, of sustainable progress in reducing the drug
trade as a whole.25
Thus, while effective and professional law enforcement is
important at all times, the experiences and data cited above
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lead to the conclusion that increased law enforcement is not the
panacea to Mexican drug trafficking. Deterrence in general does
not hold much power over the foot soldiers of Mexico’s drug
trafficking organizations; such individuals already risk a violent
death at the hands of rival traffickers or authorities. Tough law
enforcement, even if it achieved increased numbers of arrests,
would not stop new drug traffickers from emerging, lured by the
promise of economic returns in a social and economic context
that frequently offers few other opportunities to earn a dignified
income.
These points are especially relevant in a context of increasing
recognition of the failure of the regional drug war paradigm. In
February 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and
Democracy, composed of leading political figures including
former Presidents of Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil, issued its
conclusions on this subject. It strongly criticized as ineffective
the U.S.-led drug war paradigm of the past 30 years and called
for a public health approach to drug policy centered on treatment
and demand reduction.26 While it recognized the need for effective law enforcement against organized crime, the Commission
observed, “Colombia is a clear example of the limitations of the
repressive policies promoted globally by the United States”27 in
the drug war. It concluded that the sustainable solution to the
drug problem lay in “demand reduction in the major consumer
countries,” notably the United States, as well as the European
Union.28
Also noteworthy is that a February 2009 telephone survey of Mexican residents, which measured reactions to the
Commission’s report, found that 63% agreed with the statement,
“Strategies to confront drug trafficking exclusively through the
police and military have failed in Latin America.”29 More than
half of the participants in the survey (53%) agreed with the
perception that, “It has not been possible to debate openly the
subject of drugs to find new solutions, due to prejudices and
the imposition of the United States, which only wants to use the
police and military.”30
Despite recent calls to change course in international and
regional drug policies, the Mérida Initiative fails to break with
the philosophy of arresting drug-related criminals as the primary
approach to reducing drug trafficking. Given the growing recognition of the need for truly new and more efficient strategies
for reducing the flow of drugs, and given the severity of human
rights problems in Mexico, now is the time to redefine the
United States’ role in Mexico’s struggle against drug trafficking,
beginning with U.S. foreign aid programs including the Mérida
Initiative.

fuel Mexican drug violence (such as AK-47s) come from the
United States. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF) estimates that 90–95% of Mexican cartels’ weapons enter
Mexico from the southern United States, where individual buyers, benefiting from gaping loopholes in U.S. gun laws, purchase
multiple military weapons from gun sellers and then pass the
weapons to drug cartels.33
There are signs that actors in Congress and the current
administration recognize the need to step up efforts to address
these domestic problems. The administration of U.S. President
Barack Obama recently announced a border security plan that
will target the arms trade by deploying hundreds more ATF and
other agents to the southwest U.S. border. The plan also contemplates measures to reduce drug demand, such as improving drug
treatment within national healthcare systems.34 Also noteworthy
is a letter to the President signed by more than 50 members of
Congress asking for enforcement of the U.S. ban on imported
assault weapons.35 While this measure alone will not correct
underlying loopholes in U.S. gun laws, it would be a step in the
right direction.
Indeed, from its inception the Mérida Initiative has been
billed by both governments as the embodiment of U.S. recognition of its “shared responsibility” to combat drug trafficking.36
Only recently, however, have U.S. officials begun to acknowledge clearly the need to address the factors within U.S. territory
that generate drug-related violence in Mexico. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Mexico marked an important acknowledgement that, in Clinton’s words, “Our insatiable
demand for illegal drugs [in the U.S.] fuels the drug trade.”37
Despite this recognition of the need to reduce U.S. drug demand,
the visit was also accompanied by a pledge from the administration to seek $80 million from Congress to purchase Blackhawk
helicopters to support Mexico’s drug war38—an indicator of
continuing U.S. emphasis on law enforcement battles with drug
traffickers as a primary drug-fighting strategy. It is worth noting
that the Mérida Initiative itself did not introduce any new, concrete commitments in the areas of demand reduction or reduction
of arms smuggling in the United States. A change in the design
of this high-profile Initiative, coupled with a decisive shift away
from directing other foreign aid to Mexico’s military, would
thus ensure that the administration’s recent statements regarding
shared U.S. responsibility for drug trafficking truly signify a
new level of commitment by the U.S. to address efficiently the
particular ways in which it perpetuates the drug trade.
This is not to exclude the possibility of U.S. aid to Mexico. Of
great relevance would be policies and programs that create viable alternatives to illicit economic activities for Mexicans living
in poverty. In terms of public security aid packages, the Mérida
Initiative itself signals areas such as funding to support training
of drug treatment counselors and sharing of best practices in the
realm of judicial reform, both of which are potentially fruitful
areas of cooperation. In particular, effective sharing of technical
expertise to support Mexico’s transition to an adversarial judicial
system characterized by oral criminal trials and support for the
establishment of police oversight mechanisms and community
policing models would provide more sustainable contributions
to public security in both countries than, for example, funding the Mexican armed forces. A rethinking of foreign aid to
Mexico, emphasizing such institution-building and preventive
activities while eliminating military aid, would additionally send

Fighting on the Right Side of the Border
The engine driving Mexican drug trafficking is demand for
drugs in the United States, where wholesale illicit drug proceeds
reach tens of billions of dollars each year.31 As long as this level
of demand exists, drugs will continue to flow north regardless
of the level of deterrence that the security forces deploy.32 In
this regard, it is likely that the most efficient use of hundreds
of millions of dollars annually is to keep most of this money
in the United States and direct it to demand reduction through
public health services and programs to reduce drug use, such as
improved access to treatment for addiction.
Another major reason for the United States to focus attention
north of the border is that the military-style assault weapons that
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call attention to and send a message regarding the urgent need to
respect rights in the specific situations addressed. On the other
hand, failure by the U.S. administration to evaluate fulfillment
of these basic and specific conditions in good faith would send
a damaging message of tolerance for acts that the U.S. itself has
found to be human rights violations. Thus, with the Initiative
well underway, it is crucial that at least these basic human rights
elements are observed and that the U.S. State Department does
not report fulfillment of these points until the necessary progress
has actually occurred.
Mexico’s level of progress on these elements during the
first nine months of the Mérida Initiative has been far from
encouraging. For instance, since the enactment of the Mérida
Initiative, Mexico has continued to use military jurisdiction
(that is, military authorities) to investigate cases of human
rights violations committed by soldiers, a practice that has
been denounced as impermissible by national and international
human rights bodies.40 Throughout the Calderón administration,
during the first two years of which Mexico’s National Human
Rights Commission received over 1,500 reports of human rights
abuses by military forces,41 the system of military jurisdiction
has maintained impunity in cases of grave human rights violations committed by soldiers. Prompted by such concerns, in the
recent Universal Periodic Review of Mexico by the 47-member
United Nations Human Rights Council, no fewer than seven
States officially recommended to the Mexican government that
civilian authorities should have jurisdiction over cases of military human rights violations.42
Neither is there any sign that the Mérida Initiative’s human
rights reporting requirements have yet diminished the widespread use of torture by Mexican security forces. Mexico’s current lack of compliance in these areas of well-established human
rights law underscores the need for the U.S. to demonstrate that
the four human rights requirements are not merely cosmetic, but
require good faith implementation to trigger release of funding.

[T]he Mérida Initiative
and additional military
aid support a security
paradigm in Mexico that
has thus far engendered
human rights violations by
deploying forces trained
for war to perform the
work of civilian police and
has failed to hold military
forces accountable for
such violations.
a clear message that the U.S. will not fund entities that continue
to commit systematic human rights violations.

Human Rights Elements in the Mérida Initiative

Conclusion

Finally, it is worth mentioning the four human rights reporting requirements that are built into the Mérida Initiative. Fifteen
percent of the funds contemplated for Mexico under the U.S.
funding categories “International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement” and “Foreign Military Financing Program” in the
Initiative cannot be disbursed until the U.S. State Department
reports that the Mexican government is:
• Improving the transparency and accountability of its police
forces
• Ensuring that civilian (not military) prosecutors and judicial
authorities are investigating and trying members of federal
police and military forces credibly alleged to have committed human rights violations, in accordance with Mexican and
international law
• Enforcing the prohibition on using testimony obtained
through torture as evidence in court, in accordance with
Mexican and international law
• Establishing a mechanism for regular consultation between
the Mexican government and civil society to monitor implementation of the Mérida Initiative39
These human rights elements identify specific problems
requiring action or reform. Despite their limitations in the context of the overall design and political message of the Mérida
Initiative, these conditions therefore present an opportunity to

The Obama administration has a singular opportunity to
break with the drug-fighting strategies of the past, which have
focused on fighting the symptoms of the drug trade through
force, and lead the way to a modern approach that prioritizes
the causes of drug trafficking while recognizing the centrality
of respect for human rights. These goals will not be served by
a primarily law enforcement-oriented aid package, let alone one
that tacitly or publicly lauds a militarized drug war characterized
by widespread human rights violations.
The U.S. must instead prioritize domestic demand reduction
and halt the flow of assault weapons over the border if it is
to cease exporting both the motive and the means for violent
drug trafficking to Mexico. As consensus grows in the region
regarding the need to move beyond the inefficient and damaging anti-drug strategies of the last decade, it is crucial that the
U.S. government follows through and expands upon recent
declarations recognizing the need for domestic action. While
an important step forward, these should constitute only the
beginning of a profound paradigm shift in this regard in U.S.
anti-drug strategies. A failure by the United States to change
course fully now will mean not only that it finds itself working
largely on the wrong side of the border, but also on the wrong
side of history.		
HRB
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or stem the flow of drugs from the country. See Washington
Office on Latin America, Chemical Reactions: Fumigation:
Spreading Coca and Threatening Colombia’s Ecological and
Cultural Diversity, Feb. 2008, available at www.wola.org/
media/WOLA%20Chemical%20Reactions%20February%202008.
pdf; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia:
Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security has
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing

We’d like to make note of a correction to Ms. Brewer’s piece that appeared in Vol. 16, Issue 2 entitled
“Structural Human Rights Violations: The True Face of Mexico’s War on Crime.” The sentence on page 9 that
read “Researchers for Mexico’s National Human Rights Center have concluded that roughly two-thirds of
Mexico’s investigatory police rely on torture to obtain information from detainees” should read “Researchers
for Mexico’s National Human Rights Center have concluded that roughly two-thirds of authorities who employ
torture are investigatory police who rely on torture to obtain information from detainees.”
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